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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1996). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals by an order dated March 8, 2001. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The plaintiff, Silvia Nunez, was injured as a result of the alleged medical 
malpractice of the defendant, Dr. Albo. Dr. Albo was on the faculty of the University of 
Utah School of Medicine, but he maintained a private practice in Salt Lake City, away 
from the university. Dr. Albo claimed that he was immune from personal liability 
because he was a government employee acting in the scope his employment with the 
university when he treated Ms. Nunez. The trial court agreed. Did the trial court err in 
concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Albo was 
acting in the scope of his employment with the university when he treated Ms. Nunez? 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary judgment raises only 
legal issues, which this court reviews for correctness. E.g., Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991); Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 
(Utah 1991). This court does not defer to the trial court's conclusion "that facts are 
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein 
1 
& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1996). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views the facts and all 
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
(here, the plaintiff). Id.; J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales Kinglnt'l, Inc., 2000 UT 92, U 13, 17 
P.3d 1100 (citations omitted). The court will affirm "'only if the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.'" Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289 
(citation omitted). "[D]oubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue 
of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial." 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97,107 (Utah 1992). 
2. Before bringing this action, Ms. Nunez served a timely notice of claim on 
Dr. Albo and on the Utah Attorney General. She later tried to amend her complaint to 
name Dr. Albo's employers, the University of Utah and its medical school, as defendants. 
The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the proposed amendment would be 
futile because the plaintiff had not complied with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Did the trial court err in concluding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a legal 
conclusion that the court reviews for correctness, according no deference to the trial 
court. E.g., Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 668 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2 
3. The only reason the trial court gave in denying Ms. Nunez's motion to 
amend was that the motion would be futile because Ms. Nunez had not complied with the 
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. The order Dr. Albo's counsel 
prepared, and which the trial court signed over Ms. Nunez's objection, gave additional 
reasons for denying the motion to amend that the court had never made findings or ruled 
on, namely, that the motion came too late and would prejudice the defendant. Did the 
trial court err in entering an order that did not conform with the court's ruling? 
Standard of Review: Although the wording of a trial court's order is left to the 
court's discretion, proposed orders are supposed to conform to the court's ruling. 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL R. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. 4-504(1). A trial court abuses its discretion 
when it fails to comply with court rules. Allied Resources Corp. v. Mo-Vac Serv. Co., 
871 S.W.2d 773, 775-76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
4. Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiffs motion to amend her 
complaint to add the University of Utah and its medical school as defendants? 
Standard of Review: A decision denying leave to amend a complaint is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. E.g., Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76,112, 977 P.2d 497. 
"This discretion, however, is to be exercised in the furtherance of justice and must not be 
exercised so as to defeat justice." Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 
1046 (1971). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to (1) examine the relevant 
3 
facts, (2) apply a proper legal standard or (3) use a demonstrated rational process. Franz 
v. Brennan, 431 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted), affd, 440 
N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1989). An appellate court will find an abuse of discretion if it is left 
with a definite and firm conviction, after reviewing the whole record, that the trial court 
erred, Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1987); if the trial 
court's exercise of discretion is manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary, is inconsistent with 
the substantial weight of the evidence, or is based on untenable grounds, erroneous legal 
conclusions or clearly erroneous factual findings, e.g., Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 
758 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 684 P.2d 692, 698 (Wash. 1984); or 
if the trial court misapplied or ignored recognized legal principles guiding the exercise of 
its discretion, Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 941 P.2d 314, 324 (Idaho 1997); In re Estate of 
Kunzler, 707 P.2d 461,465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); Franklin v. Bartsas Realty, Inc., 598 
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Nev. 1979). The legal standard guiding the exercise of a trial court's 
discretion in granting or denying leave to amend is that leave to amend should be "freely 
given when justice so requires." UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
The first issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
(Record ("R.") 108), the plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment (R. 154), the 
memoranda and other papers in support of and in opposition to those motions (R. 101-07, 
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116-18, 133-50, 154-63, 164-81, 228-79, 280-343, 344-47, 348-59, 360-79, 406-07), and 
at the hearing on the cross-motions (R. 440, at 2-11, 21-31, 45-56). 
Issues 2 and 4 were raised by the plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint (R. 
182), in the memoranda in support of and in opposition to that motion (R. 182, 383,406), 
and at the hearing on the motion (R. 440, at 11-21, 36-45). The third issue was raised by 
the plaintiffs objection to the defendant's proposed order on the motion to amend (R. 
423-24). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Section 63-30-4 of the Utah Code and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) are 
determinative of the first issue. Sections 63-30-11 and -12 of the Utah Code are 
determinative of the second issue. Rule 4-504(1) of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial 
Administration is determinative of the third issue. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15, 
19(a) and 21 are determinative of the fourth issue. These statutes and rules are set out in 
the addendum. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
This is a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff, Silvia Nunez, brought this 
action against Dr. Dominic Albo (R. at 1-4), after first giving notice to Dr. Albo and to 
the State of Utah pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 
63-30-11, and the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-14-1 
through -16 (1996), and complying with the prelitigation panel review requirements of 
the malpractice act (R. 192-93,12; 196, If 18; 395-96). 
Dr. Albo moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he was immune from 
personal liability pursuant to section 63-30-4 of the Governmental Immunity Act.1 (R. 
1
 Section 63-30-4 states, in relevant part: 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this 
chapter against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action 
or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave 
rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or 
mal ice . . . . 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental 
entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is 
one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may 
6 
108.) The plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking a ruling that Dr. 
Albo was not acting in the scope of his employment with the University of Utah at the 
time he treated Ms. Nunez and that Dr. Albo had committed medical malpractice. (R. 
154.) The plaintiff also sought leave to amend her complaint to name the University of 
Utah and the University of Utah School of Medicine as defendants. (R. 182.) After a 
hearing, the trial court granted Dr. Albo's motion for summary judgment, denied the 
plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs motion to 
amend her complaint. (R. 440, at 52-57.) Over the plaintiffs objection (R. 423-24), the 
trial court entered a written order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and denying the plaintiffs motions (R. 428-32). This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The defendant, Dr. Dominic Albo, has been employed as a faculty member in the 
Department of Surgery at the University of Utah School of Medicine since July 1, 1968, 
and is an employee of the University of Utah Medical Center or Medical School. (R. 116, 
be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or 
failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-4(3) through (4) (1997). 
7 
1f 2; 247.) However, Dr. Albo also maintains a private practice on the side. Dr. Albo sees 
patients, such as the plaintiff, at one of two offices-one at 25 South 1100 East in Salt 
Lake City, and the other at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center in Salt Lake City. (R. 85.) 
Dr. Albo has hospital privileges at both Salt Lake Regional and the University of Utah 
Hospital. (R. 85.) Dr. Albo keeps a portion of his patient records at Salt Lake Regional. 
(R. 282, f 6.) Salt Lake Regional and, to a lesser extent, the University of Utah pay for 
Dr. Albo's secretary. (R. 299.) Dr. Albo claims that the university reimburses him for 
the operational expenses associated with his practice (such as office space, medical 
supplies and medications) (R. 307, ^ f 6), but not all of his expenses are paid by the 
university (R. 246). 
Dr. Albo treated the plaintiff, Silvia Nunez, for telangiectasia, commonly known 
as spider veins, on May 8 and 20, 1998. (R. 111,13; 165, f 1; 257, f 8.) Dr. Albo had 
Ms. Nunez sign an acknowledgment form stating that she understood that Dr. Albo was 
an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine and was subject to the 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. (R. 272.) Ms. Nunez, however, does not 
speak or understand English well. (See R. 440, at 30.) (She had to be deposed through an 
interpreter. SeeR. 139.) 
Dr. Albo treated Ms. Nunez by injecting a sclerosing agent called Polidocanol or 
Sclerovein into the veins in Ms. Nunez's legs. (R. 116, ^  3; 165, ffl[ 2-3.) Polidocanol is 
8 
not approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration. (R. 165, J^ 3; 281, j^ 3.) Dr. 
Albo obtained the sclerosing agent that he used to treat Ms. Nunez from his daughter and 
son-in-law, who bought it in Europe and brought it to Utah. (R. 301-02.) Dr. Albo has 
been "ordering [sclerosing solutions] personally" for the last thirteen or fourteen years, 
but he claims the university reimburses him for the money he spends on sclerosing 
agents. (R. 302-03.) 
Ms. Nunez paid Dr. Albo in cash. {See R. 166, % 8; 283, f 8.) However, Dr. Albo 
claims that all the money he receives from his practice of medicine is forwarded to the 
university and that his sole compensation is his salary from the university. (R. 99, ^ f 4.) 
The treatment was unsuccessful. Ms. Nunez's legs were very red and swollen, 
itched a lot and had blisters that burst, causing blood and water to come out. (R. 81-82, 
91, 141.) Ms. Nunez was left with ulcers, hyperpigmentation (large brown spots) and 
extensive scarring on her legs. (R. 165, If 2; 284, f 12.) 
Ms. Nunez claims that Dr. Albo was negligent in several respects, including using 
an excessive concentration of an unapproved drug and using an improper technique to 
administer the treatment. (R. 165-66, ffif 3-4; 179-81.) 
On or about January 6,1999, Ms. Nunez, through her attorney, sent to Dr. Albo 
and to the Utah Attorney General a notice of claim pursuant to the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-14-1 through -16, and the Utah Governmental 
9 
Immunity Act, id. §§ 63-30-1 through -38. (R. 192-93, ^ 2; 395-96.) In response, the 
Risk Management Department of the University of Utah Hospital wrote a letter to 
plaintiffs counsel dated February 16,1999, asking plaintiffs counsel to refrain from 
contacting Dr. Albo and to direct future communications to either Lynda P. Faldmo of the 
Risk Management Department or David G. Williams, who "will be entering an 
Appearance of Counsel with the Division" of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
(R. 197-98.) 
The parties went through the prelitigation process mandated by the Health Care 
Malpractice Act. (R. 196, f 18.) Then, on July 28,1999, the plaintiff filed this action 
against Dr. Albo, claiming that Dr. Albo had breached the applicable standard of care in 
treating her veins and in failing to obtain her informed consent for the treatment. (R. 3-
4.) 
On August 14, 2000, after the plaintiff and defendant had been deposed but before 
any expert discovery had taken place, Dr. Albo filed a motion for summary judgment, 
claiming he was an employee of the University of Utah Medical School and was therefore 
immune from personal liability under section 63-30-4 of the Utah Code (quoted supra pp. 
6-7 n.l). (R. 108.) On August 24, 2000, the plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment seeking, among other things, a ruling that Dr. Albo was not acting within the 
scope of his employment with the University of Utah Medical School at the time he 
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treated Ms. Nunez. (R. 154.) The plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to amend her 
complaint, stating that, if the court were to grant Dr. Albo's motion for summary 
judgment, she should be allowed to amend her complaint to name the University of Utah 
and the University of Utah School of Medicine as defendants. (R. 182.) 
The trial court granted Dr. Albo's motion for summary judgment and denied Ms. 
Nunez's motion for summary judgment. (R. 440, at 52-56.) 
The trial court also denied Ms. Nunez's motion to amend her complaint, on the 
grounds that the motion "serves no useful function" because the plaintiff failed to comply 
with the express provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, and "failure to comply 
strictly with the Governmental Immunity Act provisions [is] fatal." (R. 440, at 57.) Dr. 
Albo submitted a written order, which the trial court signed over the plaintiffs objection 
{see R. 423-24), giving as additional reasons for denying the motion to amend that 
"Plaintiffs motion comes late in the litigation process despite the fact that Plaintiff was 
fully aware of the facts underlying the proposed amendment, long before her request to 
amend. Further, Plaintiffs motion is without sufficient justification and would result in 
prejudice to Defendant." (R. 431.) The trial judge did not give any of these reasons for 
denying the motion when she denied it from the bench at the hearing {see R. 440, at 56-
57), and there was no evidence that the defendant would be prejudiced if Ms. Nunez were 
allowed to amend her complaint. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Whether Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of his employment with the 
University of Utah School of Medicine when he treated Ms. Nunez, thereby immunizing 
him from personal liability, was a disputed issue of material fact that should have 
precluded summary judgment. The evidence was insufficient to establish as a matter of 
law that Dr. Albo was performing the services he was employed to perform within the 
hours and spatial boundaries of his employment when he treated Ms. Nunez. There was 
also a genuine issue as to whether Dr. Albo's motivation in treating Ms. Nunez was to 
serve the university's interests. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting Dr. Albo's 
motion for summary judgment. 
IL Leave to amend a complaint must "be freely given when justice so 
requires." UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(a). If the underlying facts or circumstances the plaintiff 
relies on may be a proper subject of relief, she ought to be given an opportunity to amend 
to test her claim on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Although the 
grant or denial of leave to amend is within the trial court's discretion, the trial court must 
justify its refusal to allow an amendment. Id.; Ondis v. Barrows, 538 F.2d 904, 909 (1st 
Cir. 1976). None of the reasons the trial court gave justified denying Ms. Nunez leave to 
amend her complaint to name Dr. Albo's alleged employers as parties. 
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A. Ms. Nunez complied with the provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. She gave notice of her claim to Dr. Albo and the Utah Attorney General, as required 
by the statute. Therefore, the reason the trial court gave in denying the motion to amend 
was invalid. 
B. Because there was an identity of interest between Dr. Albo and his 
employers, Ms. Nunez's amended complaint against the university and its medical school 
would have related back to the date of her original complaint against Dr. Albo. 
Therefore, the amendment would have been timely and would not have been futile. 
C. The trial court signed a written order that gave additional reasons for 
denying the motion to amend, which were never ruled on at the hearing on the motion. 
The written order did not conform to the trial court's ruling and should therefore be 
disregarded. 
D. In any event, Ms. Nunez acted timely in moving to amend when it appeared 
that Dr. Albo was acting within the scope and course of his employment with the 
university when he treated her. No trial date had been set. Only limited discovery had 
taken place, and the university could use what discovery had already been done in 
defending against its vicarious liability for Dr. Albo's actions. Therefore, the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion for leave to amend. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER 
DR. ALBO WAS ACTING IN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
WITH THE UNIVERSITY WHEN HE TREATED MS. NUNEZ. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Albo, ruling that, as a matter of 
law, his care and treatment of Ms. Nunez was within the scope of his employment with 
the University of Utah and that therefore he could not be personally liable to Ms. Nunez 
under section 63-30-4 of the Governmental Immunity Act. (See R. 430. See also supra 
pp. 6-7 n. 1.) 
Dr. Albo was only entitled to summary judgment if there was "no genuine issue as 
to any material fact" and the undisputed facts showed that he was "entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). "Courts cannot weigh disputed material facts 
in ruling on a summary judgment motion." Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 
761, 765 (Utah 1988). Accord Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 
(Utah 1995). The only question for the trial court was whether a reasonable jury, faced 
with the evidence, could return a verdict for Ms. Nunez. Ultradent Prods, v. Life-Like 
Cosmetics, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (D. Utah 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 127 F.3d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "'It is of no moment that the evidence on 
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling.' . . . 'It only takes one competent 
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sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of fact/" Hardy, 763 P.2d at 765 (citations omitted). 
Whether one is acting within the scope of employment is generally a question of 
fact. See Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37, \ 9, 998 P.2d 268 (citing Jackson v. Righter, 891 
P.2d 1387,1391 (Utah 1995)). "Only when the conduct in question is so clearly either 
within or outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds could not differ as to 
the finding is the court permitted the discretion to decide as a matter of law." Id. (citing 
Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125,127 (Utah 1994)). See also Xerox Corp. v. 
Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1989) ("summary judgment must be denied 
when 'reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts'") 
(footnote omitted); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (two kinds of 
questions "are always to be decided by the jury if reasonable persons could differ about 
them on the evidence"--"fact questions in the usual sense" and "evaluative applications of 
legal standards" to the facts) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 45, at 320 (5th ed. 1984)). 
Utah law applies a three-part test for determining whether an employee was acting 
within the scope of his employment: "[T]he employee's conduct must (1) 'be of the 
general kind the employee is employed to perform,5 (2) 'occur within the hours of the 
employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment,' and (3) 'be 
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motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.'" Id. ^ 20 
(quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989)). 
In this case, there was no evidence that the University of Utah School of Medicine 
employed Dr. Albo to perform surgery on private patients. Presumably, he was employed 
to teach medical students and provide training opportunities for residents. Although Dr. 
Albo sometimes had medical students and residents who would come to observe his 
techniques and see patients, there was no evidence that any medical student or resident 
observed or was involved in Ms. Nunez's treatment. 
There was also no evidence that Dr. Albo's treatment of Ms. Nunez occurred 
within the hours and "ordinary spatial boundaries" of Dr. Albo's university employment. 
See id. Dr. Albo did not treat Ms. Nunez at the University of Utah Hospital or anywhere 
else on state property. He treated her at a private health-care facility or office, on private 
property, during his regular office hours. Dr. Albo did not keep Ms. Nunez's records at 
the university. There was no evidence that the university dictated Dr. Albo's office 
hours, told him what patients he could see, told him what medicines or equipment to use 
or otherwise controlled or had the right to control the manner in which he treated private 
patients such as Ms. Nunez. In short, in Dr. Albo's treatment of Ms. Nunez there were 
none of the usual indicia of an employment relationship between Dr. Albo and the 
university. 
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The only evidence that Dr. Albo was motivated at least in part by a desire to serve 
the university's interests was Dr. Albo's testimony that he forwards the money he 
receives from treating patients to the university and that the university in turn pays him a 
salary. (See R. 99, f 4.) Ms. Nunez, however, did not know this when she paid Dr. Albo 
for his treatment. She paid him in cash and reasonably assumed that he kept the money. 
(SeeR. 166, f 8;283,f 8.) 
From this evidence, reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to 
whether or not Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of his employment with the university 
when he treated Ms. Nunez. Cf. Noble v. Porter, 591 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (App. Div. 
1992) (whether a patient could have reasonably believed that her doctor was provided by 
the hospital or otherwise acting on the hospital's behalf was a question of fact, as was the 
question of the hospital management corporation's vicarious liability for the acts of 
hospital staff members over whom the corporation exercised some degree of control and 
supervision); Soltis v. State, 568 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471-72 (App. Div. 1991) (where a doctor 
consulted with a patient at a state facility, the patient signed a state consent form, the 
surgery took place at the state facility and the doctor was assisted by a state employee, 
questions of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff reasonably assumed the doctor was 
employed by or acting for the state). On Dr. Albo's motion for summary judgment, the 
trial court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Nunez and 
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draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. E.g., Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 
387, 389 (Utah 1984). 
Because the only prong of the scope-of-employment test that was arguably met in 
this case was the third prong, Dr. Albo would only be entitled to summary judgment if the 
financial arrangements between him and the university, of which Ms. Nunez knew 
nothing when she submitted herself to his treatment, were sufficient as a matter of law to 
prove that Dr. Albo was acting within the scope of his employment with the university 
when he treated Ms. Nunez. Such a conclusion, however, would do violence to the 
principles underlying governmental immunity. Governmental immunity was meant to 
provide "necessary protection for essential governmental activities." See DeBry v. Noble, 
889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). While training new doctors may be an essential 
governmental activity, performing elective surgery on private patients is not. Dr. Albo 
was not engaged in training or teaching medical students when he treated Ms. Nunez. In 
his treatment of Ms. Nunez, Dr. Albo was competing with other private practitioners who 
do not enjoy personal immunity or any of the other benefits of the Governmental 
Immunity Act (such as its shortened limitations period and damage cap; see UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 63-30-12, -14, -15 & -34). The university should not be allowed to sell the 
protection it enjoys as a governmental entity to private practitioners in exchange for a 
percentage of their revenues from the practice of medicine. Yet that is what the effect of 
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the trial court's ruling would be. It would allow the university to offer immunity to any 
doctor or health-care provider simply by entering into a contract by which the provider 
agreed to let medical students or residents observe his practice from time to time and 
agreed to remit some portion of his proceeds from the practice of medicine to the 
university. The court should not countenance such an abuse of governmental immunity. 
Dr. Albo was providing the same services as other private physicians, in the same 
or similar manner, in a private facility to a private patient who had no connection with the 
university or the training it provides. The jury could therefore reasonably conclude that 
Dr. Albo should have been liable the same as any other private physician. 
It only takes one disputed fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., 
Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1991). Whether Dr. Albo was acting in the 
scope of his employment with the university when he treated Ms. Nunez was a disputed 
issue of fact that made summary judgment inappropriate. The trial court therefore erred 
in granting Dr. Albo's motion for summary judgment. Cf Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 
97, 106 (Utah 1992) (an issue should not be taken from the jury "if there is any evidence 
upon which a reasonable jury could infer" the facts in favor of the opposing party) 
(emphasis added). 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE PLAINTIFF 
LEAVE TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO NAME THE UNIVERSITY 
OF UTAH AND ITS MEDICAL SCHOOL AS DEFENDANTS. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allows a plaintiff to amend her complaint "by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party" and further provides that "leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires." UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(a). Rule 15 "should 
be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated." 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993). See also Girard v. Appleby, 660 
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) (rule 15 "is to be liberally construed so as to further the 
interests of justice"), disavowed on other grounds by Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 
P.2d 115 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1936) 
("the policy of the law is toward liberality in the allowance of amendments and to regard 
them favorably in order that the real controversy between the parties may be presented, 
their rights determined, and the cause decided"); Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 148 P. 
452, 457 (1915) ("'Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to the end that cases 
may be fully and fairly presented on their merits'") (citation omitted). Trials on the 
merits are favored, and amendment of pleadings will generally be permitted unless there 
has been undue delay, bad faith or undue prejudice. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182 
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(1962); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Ms. Nunez brought this action against Dr. Albo because she thought that he was 
acting not as a faculty member of the University of Utah School of Medicine but as a 
private practitioner when he treated her. Following discovery on that issue and Dr. 
Albo's motion for summary judgment, which was supported by additional evidence, Ms. 
Nunez moved for leave to amend her complaint to add the University of Utah and the 
University of Utah School of Medicine as parties, in case Dr. Albo was found to have 
been acting in the scope of his employment with the university. (R. 182.) The trial court 
denied Ms. Nunez's motion to amend. 
A. The Plaintiff Gave Proper Notice of Her Claim Against the University Under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The ground the trial court gave in denying Ms. Nunez's motion to amend was that 
the proposed amendment would be futile because Ms. Nunez had failed to comply strictly 
with the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63-30-11. (R. 440, at 56-57.)2 Although the trial court did not specify how the 
2
 The court's written order gave as additional reasons for denying the motion 
that the motion "comes late in the litigation process" and was "without sufficient 
justification and would result in prejudice to Defendant." (R. 431.) The court did not 
give these reasons in denying the motion. {See R. 440, at 56-57.) The effect of the 
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plaintiffs notice of claim failed to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, 
presumably the defects the trial court found fatal were the facts that the notice did not 
specifically name the University of Utah or its medical school and was not served on the 
university or the medical school. The Governmental Immunity Act, however, does not 
require that the university and the medical school be specifically named or served. 
In interpreting the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, the court 
first applies its plain language and will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if that language is ambiguous. Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). The relevant provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act in effect when the 
plaintiffs claim arose are as follows: 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
written order is addressed in point II.C, infra. The additional reasons are addressed in 
point II.D, infra. 
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(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah[3] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11(2) & (3) (Supp. 2000). 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the attorney general within one year after the 
claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under 
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Id. § 63-30-12. 
Here, Ms. Nunez complied with the plain, unambiguous language of the notice-of-
claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-11(3) & 
-12. It was undisputed that Ms. Nunez served on Dr. Albo and the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah a notice of claim signed by the plaintiffs attorney that set forth "a brief 
statement of the facts" (Dr. Albo's treatment of Ms. Nunez using too strong of a solution 
that was not FDA approved), "the nature of the claim asserted" (medical malpractice) and 
"the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known" (ulcers, scarring, 
infection, inflamation and itching in Ms. Nunez's legs, requiring her to obtain other 
3
 The act defines "State" as "the state of Utah," including any "hospital, 
college, university, or other instrumentality of the state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(9). 
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medical treatment and causing her general and special damages). (See R. 395-96; 192-93, 
t 2. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11(3).) 
Dr. Albo argued, however, and the trial court apparently agreed, that the notice 
was insufficient because it did not specifically name the University of Utah or its medical 
school. Instead, the notice says that Ms. Nunez "hereby submits a claim against Dominic 
Albo M.D. and any others that may [later] be shown to be liable" to her. (R. 395.) 
There is no requirement that the notice of claim specifically name the University 
of Utah or its medical school. Section 63-30-1 l(3)(a) spells out what the notice must 
contain, and nowhere does it say that all potential defendants must be specifically named. 
Moreover, there is no requirement that the notice of claim be served on the 
university or the medical school. Such a requirement existed before the Governmental 
Immunity Act was amended in 1998. Before the 1998 amendment, section 63-30-11 
provided, in relevant part, that the notice of claim "shall be . . . directed and delivered to 
the responsible governmental entity according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 
63-30-13." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (1997). Similarly, section 63-30-
12 used to provide that notice of a claim against the state or a state employee for an act or 
omission within the scope of employment had to be filed with "the attorney general and 
the agency concerned within one year after the claim arises." Id. § 63-30-12. However, 
effective May 4, 1998 (four days before Ms. Nunez first saw Dr. Albo), the legislature 
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repealed the requirement that notice be given to the responsible governmental entity and 
provided that service on the attorney general was sufficient. See id. §§ 63-30-
1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) & -12 (Supp. 2000) (quoted supra, pp. 6-7 n.l). See also Straley v. 
Halliday, 2000 UT App 38, f 14 & n.8, 997 P.2d 338 (noting that "the Immunity Act bars 
recovery by a plaintiff unless he or she provides a timely notice of claim to the Utah 
Attorney General," and noting that the 1998 amendment did away with the requirement 
of filing a notice of claim with "the concerned agency") (emphasis added). 
Dr. Albo and the trial court relied on Straley v. Halliday, 2000 UT App 38, 997 
P.2d 338, for the proposition that Ms. Nunez's failure to comply strictly with the notice 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act was fatal to her motion for leave to amend. 
(See R. 440, at 15.) Straley is easily distinguished, however. Straley's claim arose in 
August 1996, when Judge Bruce K. Halliday denied Straley's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. In July 1997 Straley sued Judge under section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code for 
"wrongfully and willfully" refusing to allow Straley's writ. At the same time, Straley 
provided a notice of claim to the Office of the Utah Attorney General. A year later, in 
July 1998, Straley amended his complaint to allege that Judge Halliday acted with fraud 
and malice in denying his petition for habeas corpus and provided a new notice of claim, 
which also asserted that Judge Halliday acted with fraud or malice. 2000 UT App 38, ^ f 4. 
However, Straley did not send this second notice to the attorney general's office. Id. n.3. 
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Because Judge Halliday was clearly a government employee acting in the scope of his 
employment when he denied Straley's habeas corpus petition, Straley could recover 
against him only if Judge Halliday acted with fraud or malice. See id. ^ 12 & 15 (citing, 
inter alia, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-4(3) to (4), quoted supra pp. 6-7 n.l). Because 
Straley's first notice of claim and complaint did not allege fraud or malice, they could not 
support his claim against Judge Halliday personally. Id. f 15. The court stated: 
"[AJlthough the first notice of claim was sufficient in terms of the first complaint, 
Straley's action as framed in that complaint must fail." Id. (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, because Straley's first notice of claim did not allege fraud or malice, as his 
amended complaint did, "the first notice of claim [was] insufficient for the action as 
framed in the amended complaint." Id. 
The second notice of claim and amended complaint properly alleged that Judge 
Halliday acted with fraud or malice, but the second notice of claim was untimely, since it 
was not served within one year after his claim arose, and it was not served on the attorney 
general, as required by sections 63-30-11 and -12. Id. % 16. This court therefore affirmed 
dismissal of Straley's complaint, because he "failed to comply with the requirement of the 
Immunity Act that he file a timely and proper notice of his claim." Id. f 17. 
Here, Ms. Nunez served a timely notice of claim on the attorney general that was 
clearly "sufficient" as to her first complaint. Cf id. ^  15. Her first complaint failed, not 
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because there was anything wrong with the notice of claim, but because the trial court 
found that Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of his employment and thus was immune 
from personal liability under section 63-30-4. However, even if the trial court's ruling 
were correct (and it was not, for the reasons stated in point I, supra), the university could 
be vicariously liable for Dr. Albo's actions, and, unlike the amended complaint in Straley, 
which added new allegations, Ms. Nunez's proposed amended complaint makes 
essentially the same allegations against the university as she made against Dr. Albo. 
{Compare R. 1-4 with R. 188-91.) Ms. Nunez's original notice and complaint were 
clearly timely. The only issue for the trial court therefore should have been whether an 
amended complaint adding the university and medical school as defendants would relate 
back to the date of the original complaint. The trial court never addressed this issue. 
(This issue is addressed in point II.B, infra). Straley simply did not address the issue of 
whether either of Straley's notices of claim to Judge Halliday would have been sufficient 
as to the State of Utah if Straley had tried to add the state as a defendant. 
In other circumstances, Utah courts have held that "defects in the form or content 
of notices of claim do not always act to bar a claim." Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 669 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 
(Utah 1983); Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 363-64, 412 P.2d 449,450 
(1966)). Even before the Governmental Immunity Act was amended to do away with the 
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requirement of service on the state entity involved, this court found a notice of claim 
sufficient even though it was not sent to the governmental entity allegedly responsible for 
the plaintiffs injuries. Brittain, 882 P.2d at 669-73. 
In Brittain, the plaintiff was injured at a Job Service office. He filed a notice of 
claim with the attorney general and the Division of Risk Management but not with the 
Department of Employment Security, which ran the Job Service office. Id. at 668. At the 
time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that the notice of claim be filed with the 
attorney general and with "the agency concerned." Id. at 669 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 63-30-12 (1993)). The court held that the Division of Risk Management qualified as 
"the agency concerned" because service on the Division of Risk Management met the 
purposes of the notice requirement. Id. at 671-73. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said, "It is necessary to consider the policy of the 
notice requirement so that in any particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if 
the intent of the statute has been accomplished by substantial compliance with the 
statutory directive." Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citation 
omitted). "[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the 
responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation 
of the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby 
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Id. 
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(citations omitted). "Serving notice on the attorney general is intended to ensure that the 
State's legal needs are met." Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671 (citation and footnote omitted). 
See also id. at 672 n.9 ("the purpose of the notice statute is to make the State aware that a 
plaintiff actually intends to assert a claim"). 
The purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act's notice provisions were clearly 
met here. Ms. Nunez's notice of claim put the State on notice that Ms. Nunez intended to 
assert a claim for the injuries she received as a result of her treatment by Dr. Albo, a state 
employee. The State had an adequate opportunity to pursue a proper and timely 
investigation of the merits of Ms. Nunez's claim and to arrive at a timely settlement if it 
had chosen to. The State knew that Dr. Albo was a state employee, as shown by the 
February 16,1999, letter to Ms. Nunez's attorney from the university's Risk Management 
Department. (See R. 197.) Either Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of his employment 
with the state when he treated Ms. Nunez, in which case the State would be liable for his 
actions, or he was not, in which case Dr. Albo would be personally liable. The State 
clearly knew that, if Dr. Albo were found to have been acting in the scope of his 
employment, its university that employed Dr. Albo could be vicariously liable for his 
actions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-4. Filing the notice of claim with the Attorney 
General let the State know that Ms. Nunez intended to assert a claim based on Dr. Albo's 
negligent treatment of her and gave the State an opportunity to ensure that its legal needs 
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were met, as evidenced by the letter from Risk Management (R. 197). Her notice of 
claim "in no way inhibited the possibility of settling [Ms. Nunez's] claim without resort 
to litigation." See Brittain, 882 P.2d at 672. Moreover, the notice "preserved in writing" 
Ms. Nunez's account of the incident. See id. Under these circumstances, the purposes of 
the statutory notice provisions were met. See id. 
Because Ms. Nunez's notice of claim clearly complied with both the plain 
language of the Governmental Immunity Act and its purpose, the trial court erred in 
concluding that Ms. Nunez failed to comply with the notice provisions of the act and that 
her proposed amendment would therefore have been futile. 
B. An Amendment to Add the University and Its Medical School as Defendants 
Would Relate Back to the Filing of the Original Complaint. 
If Ms. Nunez's notice of claim was timely as to the University of Utah and the 
medical school, then her proposed amended complaint adding the university and the 
medical school was also timely provided it related back to the date the original complaint 
was filed. 
Under Utah law, "[wjhenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original 
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pleading." UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c). The relation-back doctrine may operate to allow an 
action to be brought even though it would otherwise be barred by the statute of 
limitations. Diehl Lumber Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 744 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Generally, rule 15(c) does not apply to amendments that add new parties "because 
such amendments amount to assertion of a new cause of action and defeat the purpose of 
the statute of limitations." Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (citation omitted). However, there is an exception to this rule. There is a 
relation back '"when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed 
or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Parties have an 
identity of interest when 'the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early stage.'" Sulzen v. 
Williams, 1999 UT App 76, % 14, 977 P.2d 497 (quoting Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 
P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)). See also Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 
214, 217 (Utah 1984) ("identity of interest" means "that the parties are so closely related 
. . . that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the 
other"). "The rationale for the exception is to prevent mechanical use of the statute of 
limitations to foreclose adjudication of a claim where the real parties in interest were 
31 
sufficiently alerted to the proceeding from an early stage/5 Vina, 761 P.2d at 586 (citation 
omitted). 
Here, there was an identity of interest between Dr. Albo and his employer (the 
University of Utah School of Medicine) such that "'"notice of the action against one 
serves to provide notice of the action to the other."'" Sulzen, 1999 UT App 76, ^  15 
(citations omitted). Ms. Nunez's claim against the University of Utah and its medical 
school is essentially the same as her claim against Dr. Albo set forth in the original 
complaint. The factual allegations of the two complaints are identical. {Compare R. 1-4 
with R. 188-91.) In fact, Ms. Nunez's claim against the university and its medical school 
is completely derivative of her claim against Dr. Albo. Her only claim against the 
university and medical school is that they are vicariously liable for Dr. Albo's malpractice 
if he was acting within the scope of his employment with them at the time he treated Ms. 
Nunez. Where, as here, a hospital or other entity is vicariously liable for the negligence 
of a physician, the doctor and the entity have a sufficient identity or unity of interest such 
that a claim against one relates back to the date of a claim against the other. See, e.g., 
Austin v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 69A N.Y.S.2d 730, 732-33 (App. Div. 1999) (citations 
omitted); Scheffv. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 496 N.Y.S.2d 58, 61 (App. Div. 1985); 
Kladek v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. ofN.Y., 491 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950-51 (Sup. Ct. 
1985). 
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Moreover, the university and its medical school clearly received such notice of Ms. 
Nunez's claim within the limitations period that they would not be prejudiced in 
maintaining their defense, as shown by the February 16, 1999, letter from the Risk 
Management Department of the University of Utah Hospital indicating that the university 
would be providing a defense of the plaintiffs claim. (See R. 197-98.) Presumably, if 
the plaintiff were allowed to amend her complaint to add the university and its medical 
school as defendants, the defendants would be defended by the same attorneys who the 
university has already hired to defend Dr. Albo. 
The university also knew or should have known that, but for an alleged mistake 
concerning Dr. Albo's presumed personal liability, the action would have been brought 
against it. 
Under the facts of this case, Ms. Nunez's proposed amendment to add the 
University of Utah and its medical school as defendants would relate back to the filing of 
her complaint against their employee, Dr. Albo, for whose acts they are claimed to be 
liable. Therefore, the proposed amendment would not have been time-barred or 
otherwise futile and should have been allowed. Cf. Denney v. United States Postal Serv., 
916 F. Supp. 1081,1083 (D. Kan. 1996) (in an action against the Postal Service, an 
amendment to name the United States as a defendant related back where the United States 
had actual notice of the action before the statute of limitations ran). 
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C. The Trial Court Erred by Entering an Order Prepared by Defense Counsel 
That Went Beyond the Court's Oral Ruling. 
The only reason the trial court gave in denying Ms. Nunez's motion to amend was 
that she had not complied with the specific procedure the legislature had established for 
bringing a claim under the Governmental Immunity Act, which made any amendment 
"fatal." (See R. 440, at 57.)4 The court directed counsel for the defendant to "prepare 
findings and . . . conclusions . . . that reflect the . . . Court's findings." (R. 440, at 57.) 
The order defense counsel prepared went well beyond the court's findings and 
conclusions and gave additional reasons for denying the motion to amend. The written 
order states: "Plaintiffs motion comes late in the litigation process despite the fact that 
Plaintiff was fully aware of the facts underlying the proposed amendment, long before her 
request to amend. Further, Plaintiffs motion is without sufficient justification and would 
result in prejudice to Defendant." (R. 431.) Although the defendant had argued these 
points in opposing the motion to amend (see R. 385-88), the trial court did not address 
these issues and made no findings on them in denying the motion to amend. (See R. 440.) 
The plaintiff filed a timely objection to the proposed order (R. 423-25), but the trial court 
entered the proposed order over the plaintiffs objection (R. 428-32). 
4
 As shown in points II.A and B, supra, the trial court's stated reason for 
denying the motion to amend was wrong. 
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Rule 4-504(1) of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration states: "In 
all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall . . . file 
with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling." 
(Emphasis added.) The order defense counsel prepared and the trial court signed did not 
conform with the trial court's ruling. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule that a "' written order 
must conform strictly to the court's decision.9" Pauk v. Pauk, 648 N.Y.S.2d 621, 625 
(App. Div. 1996) (quoting DiProspero v. Ford Motor Co., 480 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (App. 
Div. 1984)), appeal dismissed, 678 N.E.2d 1356 (N.Y. 1997). These jurisdictions hold 
that, where there is an inconsistency between the ruling and the written order, the ruling 
controls, and the inconsistency may be corrected on appeal. See id. (citing Green v. 
Morris, 548 N.Y.S.2d 899 (App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 552 N.E.2d 175 (N.Y. 
1990)). 
Although under Utah law "the language in the court's final written order controls,' 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998), the practice of adopting verbatim orders 
prepared by counsel that do not conform with the trial court's ruling, as required by rule 
4-504(1), is fraught with problems. It fosters overreaching on the part of counsel. See, 
e.g., 9 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52.14[2], at 54-46 (Daniel R. 
Coquillette et al., eds., 3d ed. 2001). It obscures the court's reasoning process. See 
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Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 313 (7th Cir. 1986) (criticizing the 
trial court for adopting the statement of facts in one party's brief as its findings of fact). It 
makes appellate review more difficult, id., because the appeals court cannot be sure what 
issues the lower court actually considered and decided. It undermines the confidence of 
litigants and the public in the judicial process. See id. It tarnishes "the appearance of 
careful, detached judicial conduct." Id. at 314. It injures the judicial system by 
diminishing the perception that "courts decide [cases] carefully and impartially." Id. 
And, by adopting rulings that the court never made on issues the court did not expressly 
consider, it may deprive the losing party of due process-adequate notice of the issues to 
be addressed and an opportunity to be heard on those issues. 
For all these reasons, this court should not consider the alternative grounds given 
in the trial court's written order for denying the plaintiffs motion to amend. 
D. The Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Was Not Untimely and Did Not Prejudice 
the Defendants. 
If this court considers the additional reasons for denying the plaintiffs motion to 
amend stated in the trial court's written order, the court should still reverse that order 
because the trial court erred in denying the motion to amend as untimely. 
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Although the timeliness of a motion to amend is one factor Utah courts consider in 
determining whether the motion was properly denied, the cases in which motions to 
amend have been held untimely have generally involved motions made on the eve of trial. 
See, e.g., Stoker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188,1189-90 (Utah 
1983) (motion made the day of trial); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) 
(motion made the day of trial); Hein fs Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271,470 P.2d 257,257 (1970) (amended answer presented for the first 
time at trial); Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216-17 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (motion made the day before trial was scheduled to begin and three years 
after the original pleading was filed), vacated, 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992); Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (motion made the morning of trial); 
Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (motion made two weeks 
before trial). 
Here, no scheduling order had ever been entered, and no trial date had yet been 
set.5 Where, as here, an amendment would not have delayed trial, Utah courts have 
5
 The plaintiff filed a request for trial setting on March 31, 2000 (R. 54), but 
the defendant opposed the request on the grounds that "this case has only been pending 
for a short time" (R. 59), and "only a limited amount of discovery has occurred" (R. 58). 
The defendant noted that "no experts have been designated or deposed in this case," and 
added that, since this is a medical malpractice case, "expert discovery is likely the most 
important aspect of the discovery process in this case." (R. 59.) A scheduling conference 
was noticed (R. 61), but no scheduling order was ever entered and no trial date set. The 
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generally allowed the amendment. See, e.g., Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah 
1981); Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) ("The rule in this 
state has always been to allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is 
this true before trial") (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
"' A primary consideration that a trial judge must take into account in determining 
whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing side would be put to 
unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not time to 
prepare.'" Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,1389 (Utah 1996) (quoting Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). See also Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App.) (the primary considerations in 
considering a motion to amend are whether the parties have had adequate notice to meet 
new issues and whether any party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Here, the defendants would not have been unfairly 
disadvantaged by Ms. Nunez's proposed amendment but had more than enough time to 
prepare to defend her claim. No trial date had been set, and no expert discovery had 
taken place. The proposed amendment did not add any new claims or theories of 
recovery. It simply stated a claim against Dr. Albo's employers in the event Dr. Albo 
defendant filed his motion for partial summary judgment some three months later. The 
only discovery to take place in the interim was the plaintiffs deposition. {See R. 64.) 
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was found to have been acting in the scope of his employment and was thus immune from 
personal liability. The liability of the university and its medical school was purely 
derivative of any liability Dr. Albo would have had had he not been a state employee 
acting in the scope of his employment. Hence, the defendants could use any discovery 
that had already been done, and the amendment would not have required any additional 
discovery that would not have had to have been done in any event. Cf. Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455,464 (Utah 1983) (amendment proper where the record did 
not have "to be amplified by either party to permit a proper adjudication of the issue"). 
Under similar facts, Utah courts have freely allowed amendments to pleadings. See, e.g., 
id.; Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 
449-50 (1973); Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046,1047. 
The fact that Ms. Nunez and her attorney knew that Dr. Albo was a faculty 
member at the University of Utah School of Medicine before they brought this action is 
not fatal to their motion to amend. Although Ms. Nunez signed an acknowledgment form 
stating that she understood that Dr. Albo was an employee of the University of Utah 
School of Medicine and subject to the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act (R. 
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377), Ms. Nunez had only a limited understanding of English. Dr. Albo did not dispute 
that Ms. Nunez did not understand the form. (See R. 440, at 30.)6 
Similarly, although the university's Risk Management Department sent a letter to 
plaintiffs counsel stating that Dr. Albo was an employee of the university (R. 197), 
whether or not Dr. Albo was a university employee acting in the scope of his employment 
at the time he treated Ms. Nunez depends on the facts of the case and not on Ms. Nunez's 
acknowledgment that he was a university employee or even on the university's 
acknowledgment that he was its employee. Everything an employee does is not 
necessarily done in the scope and course of his employment. Cf. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 
UT 82, f 7, 987 P.2d 36 (a complaint against a district court judge that did not designate 
the context in which the judge's allegedly tortious acts occurred could state a claim 
against the judge for conduct "outside the performance of her duties, not within the scope 
of her employment, and not under color of authority," and hence not governed by the 
Governmental Immunity Act). 
The facts that were known to Ms. Nunez and her attorney when they filed this 
action and for some time thereafter were that Dr. Albo was employed as a faculty member 
at the University of Utah but also conducted a private medical practice on the side, that 
6
 With respect to another form Ms. Nunez signed at the same time, she 
testified (through an interpreter) that Dr. Albo read the form but she "didn't understand it 
and he gave it to me so I would sign it." (R. 150.) 
40 
Ms. Nunez saw Dr. Albo for treatment of her spider veins at a private office near Salt 
Lake Regional Medical Center, that Dr. Albo was not instructing or overseeing any 
medical students or residents when he treated Ms. Nuiiez, and that Ms. Nunez paid Dr. 
Albo in cash for the treatment and presumed that Dr. Albo kept the money. (See R. 1-4; 
155-56, fflf 6-9.) From these facts, Ms. Nunez and her attorney reasonably believed that 
Dr. Albo was not acting in the scope of his employment as a faculty member of the 
University of Utah when he treated Ms. Nuiiez and was therefore subject to personal 
liability. That is why they brought this action originally against Dr. Albo and not against 
the university. 
Dr. Albo and the attorneys the university provided for him must have recognized 
that there was at least the potential for him to be personally liable to Ms. Nuiiez, 
depending on how the facts developed. Otherwise, Dr. Albo would have filed a motion to 
dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) rather than going through months of 
discovery before filing a motion for summary judgment. Dr. Albo therefore should not be 
heard to argue that Ms. Nuiiez should have known earlier that she did not have a claim 
against him personally but only against his employer. 
If Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of his university employment when he treated 
Ms. Nuiiez, then he was properly joined in the action in his representative capacity, under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-4(4), and Ms. Nunez's proposed amendment would have 
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simply corrected a misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. As such, the proposed 
amendment was permitted if not required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 19(a) provides in relevant part: "A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of [the] action shall be joined as a party in the action if . . . in his absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties . . . . " UTAH R. CIV. P. 
19(a) (emphasis added). Here, the university and its medical school were subject to 
service of process, and their joinder would not have deprived the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. On their other hand, if Dr. Albo is ultimately found to have been acting in 
the scope of his university employment, then complete relief cannot be accorded to Ms. 
Nunez in the absence of the university and its medical school because, under section 63-
30-4(3) and (4) of the Governmental Immunity Act, Dr. Albo cannot be personally liable 
for his acts and omissions. 
Similarly, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides in relevant part: "Misjoinder 
of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by 
order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action 
and on such terms as are just." (Emphasis added.) 
The fact that Ms. Nunez's proposed amendment might have caused some minimal 
delay in the proceedings or increased costs was not grounds for denying leave to amend. 
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See, e.g., LePet, Inc. v. Mower, 872 P.2d 470,473 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("without more, 
delay is not a proper reason to deny joinder under Rule 19"); Intermountain Physical 
Med. Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131,1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("the 
specter of increased costs and complexity if the amendment was granted" was insufficient 
reason for denying an amendment under rule 19). 
Under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
the plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege that, if Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of 
his employment with the university and its medical school, then his employers were 
vicariously liable for his malpractice. Cf. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981) 
(upholding an order allowing the defendant to amend its answer to assert as a defense that 
workers' compensation was the plaintiffs sole remedy, even though the defendant had 
previously taken the position that the plaintiff was not covered by workers' compensation 
because he was an independent contractor and not an employee and even though two 
pretrial orders recited as uncontroverted the fact that the plaintiff was not covered by 
worker's compensation). 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether Dr. Albo was acting in the scope of his employment with the University 
of Utah Medical School when he treated Ms. Nunez was a genuine issue of material fact. 
The trial court therefore erred in granting Dr. Albo's motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court also erred in denying Ms. Nunez's motion to amend her complaint 
to add the university and its medical school as defendants. If Dr. Albo was acting in the 
scope of his employment, then the university could be vicariously liable for his actions, 
and the university clearly had notice of the plaintiffs claim and would not be prejudiced 
by the proposed amendment. 
Therefore, this court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Dr. Albo and should reverse its denial of the plaintiffs motion to amend her 
complaint. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2001. 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
^SVAAJ 1/K ^^hAMsti^ 
(Original signature) David R. Olsen 
Paul M. Simmons 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
Loren M. Lambert 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
46 
Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
§ 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect 
of waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — 
Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or for 
governmental entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is 
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private 
person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of 
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as 
imposing strict liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under 
state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this chapter 
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or 
omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding 
based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in 
Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c) [relating to driving or working under the 
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs]. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable for acts 
or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee 
acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
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Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 2000) 
§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice - Contents — Service — Legal disability 
[Effective until July 1,2001] 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim 
were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file 
a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, 
when the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is 
against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of 
Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, 
or executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public 
board, commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to 
the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may 
extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
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(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
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Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 2000) 
§ 63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee - Time for filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15, Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to 
meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since 
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. 
If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, 
it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a 
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the 
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 21. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be 
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at 
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be 
severed and proceeded with separately. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion [for summary judgment], 
memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
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Judicial Council Rule of Judicial Administration 4-504. Written orders, judgments 
and decrees. 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling 
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the 
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
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Transcript of Hearing on Motions, November 28,2000 (R. 440), pp. 52-: 
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we assert that they can't meet them and then sit back and 
wait and see if the plaintiff comes forward with evidence. 
This is the opposite, this is a plaintiff who bears the 
burden and must show evidence to support a prima facie case, 
saying, we think we win, here's my averments. That's not 
sufficient. 
There is no admissible facts in front of the Court 
that would support the elements of plaintiff's case, so for 
that reason, summary judgment should be denied. 
Even if we assume that there were those facts, if 
we say that the expert report that's not sworn to, that's 
not an affidavit, that's not notarize—you know, that's not-
-doesn't have admissible qualities, even if you assume that 
that's admissible, then you have controverted testimony the 
other way. Dr. Albo— 
THE COURT: Which then makes it a disputed fact. 
MR. MILLER: Which then makes it a question of—a 
genuine issue of material fact and therefore, summary 
judgment should be denied. So that— 
THE COURT: Okay. As to plaintiff's motion—let's 
see. Mr. Lambert, do you have a rebuttal? 
MR. LAMBERT: I don't, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. As to plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, I am denying that—that motion basically 
for the reasons that—that I've already stated. Why you 
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don't have <to—clearly under the rules, you don't have to 
provide a—a supporting affidavit, once a supporting 
affidavit has been brought forward, you either have to 
respond with another one that creates either material issues 
of fact, or if there are no issues of fact, then—then there 
is a—there is a judgment as to law; but I don't see that 
any—I mean, you've just made these sort of generic 
allegations that he committed malpractice, one, you want me 
to find as a matter of law that he, you know, committed 
malpractice and—and I have, I mean, nothing here that—that 
would—assuming that—that the specific factual issues 
weren't disputed, that would lead me to—to conclude that 
this—that there was an entitlement to judgment as a matter 
of law. I think that there are clearly material factual 
issues in dispute that preclude the entry of summary 
judgment on plaintiff's motion. 
As to defendant's motion for summary judgment, I 
basically did a careful analysis of everything in the record 
to determine what was and wasn't undisputed—without dispute 
and if there was a dispute, whether that dispute was more 
than a mere allegation or whether in fact there was some 
support in the record. 
I am satisfied that the record establishes as an 
undisputed—the following undisputed facts: that Dr. Albo 
was hired as a faculty member in the school of medicine; 
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that as a faculty member, he is—he is expected and was 
expected by his employer to engage in clinical work as an 
integral function of his faculty duties; that as part of his 
teaching duties, he also instructs and dem—or demonstrates 
for medical students and residents; that in the process of 
doing that and by practicing and being observed by residents 
in addition to just the didactic presentation, which 
presumably he also does, but that's beyond the scope here, 
but that by practicing and being observed by the residents 
and the medical students, his employer, the medical school 
is deriving a direct benefit in its instructional mission. 
It is also undisputed that plaintiff was told at 
the very beginning and signed a statement acknowledging that 
Dr. Albo was an employee of the University Medical Center— 
the School of Medicine and that he was also covered by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
It is undisputed that—that the billing performed 
for Dr. Albo's medical services was done in the name of the 
University. 
Then I find that there are a number of other facts 
that, while plaintiff has disputed, there is no support on 
the record for the plaintiff's dispute and therefore, based 
on the admissible information before me, admissible evidence 
before me, the only record evidence is that the University 
provides financial underwriting to Dr. Albo's practice, as 
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evidenced by the reimbursement of the lease, the payments 
for the medical—for the personnel, the secretary, at least 
partially and residents, full—fully. That Dr. Albo is 
reimbursed for the costs of the sclerosing agent. 
I also find that there is no con—contestable 
facts on the record or supportable facts on the record that-
-that undermine a finding that the monies collected by Dr. 
Albo in connection with the performance of medical services 
is collected and forwarded to the University and that his 
compensation comes exclusively from his salary for his 
position, that it is his sole compensation, sole source of 
income without any side compensation. 
I find that those are all clear evidences that— 
that the record—the undisputed or—or supported evidence on 
the record supports the conclusion, the legal conclusion 
that Dr. Albo was operating within the scope and in the 
course of his employment and within the scope of his 
employment. 
The—the two areas where plaintiff has identified, 
you know, that—as—as indicia to suggest some additional 
problem or a dispute as to whether there is a—whether Dr. 
Albo was acting within the scope of employment are really 
not facts that are in dispute, really, that sort of the 
legal conclusion that flows from those facts that is—that 
is disputed. 
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There is no dispute that patient records were 
kept, at least some patient records were kept by Dr. Albo at 
Salt Lake Regional. 
It's also not disputed by Dr. Albo that the—the 
agent that was used in treating Ms. Nunez was purchased in 
Europe, transported to the United States by relatives; but 
again, the issue for me is: Are there disputed material 
issues of fact? These are not disputed but I'm not sure 
that they are material, only incidentally as—as sort of 
indicia. 
I am satisfied that the undisputed and supported 
evidences in the record clearly support the conclusion that-
-that this was actually within the scope of employment. And 
while the affidavits of Dr. Sperry, in my view, are just a— 
a—the relevant portion that goes to this issue is—is mere-
-is a mere conclusion of law, it reinforces this Court's 
conclusion that—that all the facts go one way and can—and 
aren't—the undisputed facts all go one way and lead 
inescapably to the conclusion that these were actions within 
the scope of employment. So, Dr. Sperry's conclusions 
simply reinforce that—the Court's conclusion. 
Accordingly, I believe that it is appropriate to 
dismiss—to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
The only remaining dispositive issue is whether— 
is—is a ruling on the motion to amend the complaint. And 
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while I've; you know, given close consideration to 
plaintiff's argument, I—I ultimately come back to the 
proposition that the best—that policy determinations are 
best left to the legislature. The best guidance and 
evidence of the legislative intent is the language that they 
use expressly and the express language of the Governmental 
Immunities Act provides for a specific procedure that must 
be brought and followed within a given time period in order 
to assert a claim against the governmental entity. 
Even granting that motions to amend complaints 
normally should be granted liberally, in this case, the 
motion to amend the complaint serves no useful function 
because in my view, it runs up headlong into the—the 
express provisions of the statute. 
And the case law all, in my view, compel the 
decision, the determination that failure to comply strictly 
with the Governmental Immunity Act provisions if fatal. 
Accordingly, the motion to amend the complaint is also 
denied. 
I think that deals with all the dispositive 
motions and precludes having a—moot out any other matters. 
All right. Counsel, I would appreciate it if you 
could prepare findings and—and conclusions that support— 
that—that—that reflect the—the Court's findings. 
MR. MILLER: Well, while I wrote quickly, I'm 
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DAVID G. WILLIAMS (A3481) 
BRIAN P. MILLER (A6933) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SILVIA NUNEZ, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFFS 
CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
vs. JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE 
DOMINIC ALBO, M.D., TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Defendant. Civil No. 990406551 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
These matters came before the Court for ruling on November 28, 2000, pursuant to 
applicable Notices to Submit and Request for Ruling. Before the Court for review were the 
following: 1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Plaintiffs Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 3) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint; and 4) Defendant's Motion 
for Protective Order. The Court, having reviewed the file and all of the memoranda filed both 
in support of and in opposition to the pending motions and also having reviewed portions of 
depositions and affidavits and other evidence attached as exhibits to the memoranda, having 
heard oral argument and otherwise being fully informed, finds as follows: 
1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
The Court, after reviewing all of the memoranda, exhibits and evidence in the file and 
provided by the parties and after hearing argument on this Motion finds that the following are 
undisputed facts: 
a) Defendant was at all times relevant employed as a faculty member at the 
University of Utah School of Medicine; 
b) As a faculty member, Defendant is and was expected by his employer to engage 
in clinical work as an integral function of his faculty duties; 
c) As a faculty member, Defendant is and was expected to perform teaching 
duties, including instructing or demonstrating for medical students and residents medical 
procedures and clinical treatment, which provides a benefit to his employer, the University of 
Utah School of Medicine; 
d) Plaintiff was told at the very beginning of her care and treatment by Defendant, 
and, in fact, signed a statement acknowledging, that Defendant was an employee of the 
University of Utah School of Medicine and that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 
Act) applied to any care and treatment rendered by him to her. 
e) The billing performed for Defendant's medical services was done in the name of 
the University. 
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f) The University paid for the office space in which Defendant practiced, 
payments for office personnel, provision of residents and other medical students, and 
reimbursement for the medications used to treat his patients, and in particular, the sclerosing 
agent used to treat Plaintiff. 
g) The fees collected by Defendant in connection with the performance of medical 
services are and were collected by the University and Defendant's compensation is exclusively 
his salary from the University. Defendant received no side compensation or income apart 
from his salary from the University. 
In light of these uncontroverted facts and those contained in Defendant's memoranda, 
the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of Defendant's 
employment. This Court finds that as a matter of law, at all times relevant to this action, 
Defendant was employed by the University of Utah School of Medicine and his care and 
treatment of Plaintiff was within the course and scope of his employment with the University. 
This Court further holds that the Act applies to Defendant in this case and Summary 
Judgment is appropriate. Based on the arguments and evidence contained in Defendant's 
memoranda, the Court finds that Plaintiffs attack, on constitutional grounds, of the Act must 
fail, both generally and as applied to Plaintiff in this case. For these reasons and for the 
reasons set forth in Defendant's Memorandum in Support and Reply Memorandum, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted; 
2) Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Plaintiff has not produced competent admissible evidence to support a prima facie case 
regarding standard of care. Even if she had, genuine issues of feet would exist based on Dr. 
Albo's affidavit. Furthermore, Plaintiffs Motion must fail based on the Court's ruling on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For these reasons and for the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
must be denied; 
3) Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint: 
Plaintiff moves the Court for leave to amend her Complaint to add the University as a 
defendant. Plaintiff has failed to show an adequate basis for her motion to amend. Plaintiffs 
motion comes late in the litigation process despite the fact that Plaintiff was fully aware of the 
facts underlying the proposed amendment, long before her request to amend. Further, 
Plaintiffs motion is without sufficient justification and would result in prejudice to Defendant. 
In addition to the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs proposed Amendment would be 
futile, if allowed. Plaintiff failed to comply with the express language of Section 63-30-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, which outlines the requirement of filing a notice of claim against a 
governmental entity. Since Plaintiff failed to comply with the statute, any amendment to add 
the University as a party would be futile. For these reasons and for the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint should be 
denied; and 
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4) Defendant's Motion for Protective Order: 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order is moot in light of the above and therefore no 
order is made thereon. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Dominic 
Albo, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiffs Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is denied. Plaintiffs 
$300 undertaking may be applied to her bond on appeal if she chooses to appeal this order. 
DATED this _£5^day of feemb^ 200&-
BY THE COURT: 
DENISE P. LINDNER'S 
District Court Judge 
N:\91«3\854\BFM\SIORDBR. WFD 
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